Security
Built so you don't have to trust us
A digital estate is the most valuable thing you can hand to a service. So we built it so our servers store everything and can read nothing. Here is how that works, and where the limits are.
What we store, and what we don't
What we can see
- Your email address and those of your contacts
- The number and size of your encrypted entries
- When you checked in and when reminders went out
- Which entry is assigned to which person
What we never see
- Titles, types, notes and logins of your entries
- Your passphrase and recovery code
- Your private key and the keys of your entries
How release works
Every entry has its own key. For each contact it is split into two halves that only work together.
- 01
Encrypt
Your browser encrypts the entry with a random key.
- 02
Split
The key is masked with a random release pad and sealed for your contact.
- 03
Hold
Your contact can't use their half. We keep the pad, encrypted, and have no access to their half.
- 04
Release
Only after release do we send the pad. Your contact's browser combines both and decrypts.
Contact's half
seal(pk, DK ⊕ R)
Release pad with us
R
Only together: access
DK
Primitives
We only use established building blocks from libsodium and invent no cryptography of our own.
| Purpose | Primitive |
|---|---|
| Passphrase to key | Argon2id, deliberately costly in time and memory |
| Encrypting entries | XChaCha20-Poly1305 with a random nonce |
| Sealing keys for people | X25519 sealed box |
| Release pad on the server | AES-256-GCM, bound to entry and person |
Threat model
Who we protect against, and what risk remains.
| Attacker | Protected | Remaining risk |
|---|---|---|
| Us as operators, a data leak, an official request | All content of your entries | Metadata such as email addresses, number of entries and timestamps |
| A contact before release | All entries, including theirs | None |
| A contact after release | Entries assigned to others | None |
| Operator and contact together before release | Not fully | Known limit, see below |
| Tampered code in the browser | Not fully | Known limit of every encrypted web app |
Known limits
Being honest about weaknesses is part of a security model.
The code comes from our server
Like every encrypted web app, the server delivers the code that does the encryption. A compromised server could ship tampered code. Planned: open source cryptography and verifiable builds.
Operator and contact working together
If we worked with one of your contacts, together we could open that contact's entries before release. For high-value entries we plan to split keys across several people, so one person is never enough.
Losing passphrase and code
Without your passphrase and recovery code, nobody can recover your entries, including us. The same goes for your contacts.
Metadata
We see who assigned what to whom and when you check in. We need this to send reminders and release.
Hosting and infrastructure
- Database and sign-in: Supabase, data centre in Frankfurt, Germany (AWS eu-central-1)
- App delivery: Cloudflare Workers, a global network that runs at the location nearest to you
- Email delivery: a provider with an EU region, content never includes logins
Found a vulnerability?
Write to hello@heirkey.app. We answer quickly, credit you if you like and take no legal action against responsible reports.
Getting things in order takes one evening
Start with your three most important entries. Add the rest whenever something comes to mind.
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